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THE EDUCATION JUSTICE: THE
HONORABLE LEWIS FRANKLIN POWELL, JR.
Professor Victoria J. Dodd*
INTRODUCTION
The Honorable Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr. is "the education Jus-
tice" of the United States. During his tenure on the U.S. Supreme
Court, from 1971 to 1987, Justice Powell authored at least twenty
major opinions in education law, in addition to numerous signifi-
cant concurrences and dissents. Just a sampling of Justice Powell's
majority opinions on education could form the bulk of an educa-
tion law textbook recognizable by any American law student.
Among Justice Powell's most memorable education opinions are
Healy v. James,1 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez,2 Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist,3 Ingraham v. Wright,4 Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,5
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,6 Ambach v.
Norwick,7 Southeastern Community College v. Davis,8 National La-
* Victoria J. Dodd, Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, Boston,
Massachusetts. B.A., Radcliffe College, 1970; J.D., University of Southern California,
1978. Professor Dodd is the immediate past chairperson of the Education Law Sec-
tion of the Association of American Law Schools. Thanks go to Ellen Delaney of the
Suffolk University Law School Law Library for her assistance in researching Justice
Powell's biography.
1. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (upholding right of college students to
organize a chapter of Students for a Democratic Society).
2. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding no vio-
lation of equal protection clause in local property tax funding of public schools in
Texas).
3. Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
(holding New York law subsidizing non public schools to violate Establishment
Clause).
4. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (finding use of corporal punishment
in public schools did not violate the Eighth Amendment or procedural due process).
5. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (holding that teachers may
stop their union from spending its funds to support political views or political
candidates).
6. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (allowing use of
race as one factor in admission to public university).
7. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (finding no violation of equal protec-
tion in New York's refusal to grant teacher certification to non-American citizens).
8. Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397-(1979) (finding no violation of
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in refusal of state nursing school to admit hearing
impaired student).
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bor Relations Board v. Yeshiva University,9 Widmar v. Vincent,1"
Martinez v. Bynum," and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.2
A complete listing of Justice Powell's opinions relating to educa-
tion appears in the appendix at the end of this Article.
Even more illustrative of Justice Powell's appellation as "the ed-
ucation Justice" are his deep connections, both public and private,
to elementary, secondary, and higher education. These connec-
tions inevitably influenced Justice Powell's views on education,
much as Justice Harry A. Blackmun's role as general counsel for
the Mayo Clinic permeated his majority opinion in Roe v. Wade.1 3
This Article will explore some of Justice Powell's major Supreme
Court rulings in education law. It will also consider how these rul-
ings may have related to aspects of Justice Powell's life. In addi-
tion, the Article will briefly describe the Supreme Court's current
views on education and will attempt to describe how Justice Powell
might analyze these issues today. At least one sitting Justice on the
Supreme Court, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, appears to have
been influenced by Justice Powell's views.14 Justice O'Connor oc-
cupies a similar ideological position on the Supreme Court as did
Justice Powell, who wrote more than 250 majority opinions and
whose "knack for being on the winning side never dropped below
eighty per cent in any term, and often exceeded ninety per cent.' 15
In the first part of the Article, a brief biography of Justice Powell
will be presented, emphasizing his connection to education. The
9. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 442 U.S. 672 (1980) (finding that faculty members at
private university are managerial employees and therefore unable to unionize under
National Labor Relations Act).
10. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a public university must
give religious groups the same access to university facilities as non-religious groups).
11. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (upholding Texas law requiring chil-
dren to be bonafide residents of a school district).
12. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (overturning school board
plan that laid off white teachers before African-American teachers regardless of their
seniority).
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a women's fundamental right
to privacy under substantive due process encompasses her decision whether or not to
terminate a pregnancy). In Roe, Justice Blackmun discussed the history of abortion at
some length and based his constitutional tests on a tripartite scheme corresponding to
a medical view of gestation.
14. See Sandra Day O'Connor, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F Powell, Jr., 101 HARV.
L. REV. 395 (1987). Justice O'Connor mentions Justice Powell's concern for public
education. Id. at 396-397. Justice O'Connor also gave a eulogy at Justice Powell's
funeral. Justice and Mrs. Lewis F Powell, Jr.: A Son's Perspective, 33 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1999).
15. Burt Neuborne, Lewis F Powell, Jr., in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1631-32 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997).
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second part of the Article will discuss Justice Powell's views in
three extremely important cases: San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,16 Ingraham v. Wright,17 and Committee of
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.18 Woven into
the case discussions will be aspects of Justice Powell's biography, as
well as the present Supreme Court's thoughts on these issues. The
last section of the Article will focus on the Bakke 9 opinion, asking
if the Supreme Court can sustain Justice Powell's reasoning in
Bakke today.
I. A BRIEF LOOK AT JUSTICE POWELL'S LIFE,20 PARTICULARLY
IN THE REALM OF EDUCATION
Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr., was born on September 19, 1907, in
Suffolk, Virginia. His father was a hardworking and prosperous
businessman who never let his offspring take their comfort for
granted. Powell's father required him to work during the summer
at various blue-collar occupations. 21 Although a bit roughhewn,
Justice Powell's father traced his roots to the Jamestown, Virginia
settlers of 1607, a fact which invoked references to Justice Powell
as a patrician Southern gentleman.22
Justice Powell considered his upbringing to have been very tradi-
tional. He stated, "I was raised in a very devout Christian family.
We would have prayers every morning after breakfast, and every
evening we'd kneel to pray and read a few verses from the Bi-
ble."' 23 Justice Powell as a youth attended McGuire's University
School, a private preparatory school.24 Although it was assumed
that Justice Powell would select the University of Virginia as his
16. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
17. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
18. Comm. of Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
19. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
20. There is a significant amount of material available concerning the life and
work of Justice Powell. The most extensive single work is JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,
JR., by John C. Jeffries, Jr., who clerked for Justice Powell during the 1973 term.
Another valuable resource is the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, which are kept at
Washington and Lee University, Justice Powell's alma mater. A listing of the
Archive's materials appears in THE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. PAPERS: A GUIDE (John N.
Jacob archivist, 1997) [hereinafter THE POWELL PAPERS]. Another helpful article is
Melvin I. Urofsky, Mr. Justice Powell and Education: the Balancing of Competing
Values, 13 J.L. EDUC. 581 (1984).
21. Donna Haupt, A Justice Reflects, 2 CONST. 16, 20 (1990).
22. See, e.g., Ray McAllister, The Southern Gentleman, 74 A.B.A. J. 48 (1988).
23. Haupt, supra note 21, at 19. Justice Powell grew up in the Baptist tradition,
but later belonged to a Presbyterian congregation.
24. Id. (quoting Justice Powell).
2001]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
alma mater, he instead chose Washington and Lee because, accord-
ing to some observers, he was promised a spot on the school's base-
ball team.25
Justice Powell excelled as a college student. He was elected to
Phi Beta Kappa, became president of the student body, and was
editor of the student newspaper.26 These experiences no doubt
later affected his views on university speech issues.27 Justice Powell
also attended law school at Washington and Lee, was elected to the
Order of the Coif, and finished first in his class, even as he com-
pleted the course of study in two years.2 8 At his father's sugges-
tion, Justice Powell then studied at the Harvard Law School,
finishing his L.L.M. in 1932.9
Although exclusively educated in private schools, Justice Powell
did much in the interest of public education. He was elected by the
City Council to the Richmond School Board,3 ° which he chaired
from 1952 to 1961. 31 He was also a president of the Virginia State
Board of Education, a member of the Virginia State Library
Board,32 and a board member of the Virginia Foundation of Inde-
pendent Colleges.33
The only controversy regarding any aspect of Justice Powell's life
concerns his role on the Richmond School Board during the post-
Brown v. Board of Education period. Although some authorities
portray his integration efforts as exemplary,34 others point to the
segregatory practices of the Richmond school district revealed in
the Bradley v. School Board case. 35 The circumstances of the Brad-
25. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 491 (Clare Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995).
26. Neuborne, supra note 15, at 1633; see also Norman Dorsen, Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr.: A Biography-A Review Essay, 19 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 140 (1994).
27. See, e.g, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a public univer-
sity must give religious groups the same access to university facilities as non-religious
groups); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (upholding right of college students to
organize a chapter of Students for a Democratic Society).
28. S. REP. No. 92-17, at 1 (1971).
29. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 25, at 492.
30. Id.
31. S. REP. No. 92-17, at 2 (1971).
32. No doubt Justice Powell's service on the Virginia State Library Board influ-
enced his dissenting view in Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
33. THE POWELL PAPERS, supra note 20, at 14, 29.
34. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 661 (Kermit L. Hall ed.,
1992) ("[H]e presided over the successful, disturbance-free integration of the city's
schools."); Oliver W. Hill, A Tribute to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in THE LEWIS F. POWELL,
JR. PAPERS: A GUIDE 19-20 (1992) (describing Justice Powell's calm bravery in lead-
ing a stormy school board meeting concerning desegregation).




ley case were extensively analyzed during Justice Powell's congres-
sional confirmation proceedings,36 leading Senators Bayh, Hart,
Kennedy, and Tunney to file a separate report in which they con-
cluded: "We are convinced that Lewis Powell was bucking the op-
position to change, pushing slowly but steadily towards the time
when all the schools could be integrated.
37
In addition to being both president of the American Bar Associ-
ation and the American College of Trial Lawyers, Justice Powell
served on the governing boards of Hollins College, Union Theolog-
ical Seminary, and Washington and Lee University.38 It is difficult
to conceive of someone who could have had a more intimate
knowledge of all facets of American education than the Honorable
Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THREE OF JUSTICE POWELL'S
EDUCATION OPINIONS
A. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
Other than the Bakke decision, perhaps the most famous of Jus-
tice Powell's majority opinions in education law is San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez.39 It is also one of his
earliest major opinions, written just two years after his appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court in 1973.
The facts of the Rodriguez case involved the public school fi-
nancing system of Texas. The plaintiffs were a class of minority
and low-income school children throughout Texas. They claimed
that the Texas system of public school financing, which relied heav-
ily on local property taxes, violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Interestingly enough, the plaintiffs
had prevailed at the district court level,40 and the state took a di-
rect appeal to the Supreme Court.41 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court reversed the lower federal court's decision.42
Justice Powell understood the profound implications of the case
he was ruling upon. Early in the opinion he referred to "the far-
36. Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings
Before the Comm. of the Judiciary of the United States S., 92d Cong. 361-397 (1971)
(testimony of Senator John Conyers, Jr.).
37. S. REP. No. 92-17, at 8 (1971).
38. THE POWELL PAPERS, supra note 20, at 11.
39. San Antonio Indepen. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
40. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.
1971).
41. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 1.
42. Id. at 59.
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reaching constitutional questions presented. '43 At the end of the
case, he cautioned "the constitutional judgment reached by the
District Court and approved by our dissenting Brothers today
would occasion in Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented upheaval
in public education." 44
Thus from the outset, Justice Powell in Rodriguez was concerned
with local stability, the same principles that apparently guided him
in his stewardship of the Richmond school board during desegrega-
tion.45 Justice Powell was also aware of the potential financial im-
pact of the case and questioned whether any real improvement in
education would result 6.4  As a member of both local and state
school boards,47 Powell surely would have known of the difficulties
in persuading a state legislature to enlarge state funding for any
local activity.
The bulk of the Rodriguez opinion is spent on three main argu-
ments: that wealth is not a suspect class; that education is not a
fundamental right; and that federal courts should not interfere with
important state policy decisions. Each of these premises seems in-
formed by Justice Powell's experience in the education realm.
Justice Powell first analyzed the Court's precedents concerning
classifications of wealth and determined that a recognized equal
protection violation occurs only when poverty causes an absolute
deprivation 48 of a state benefit. He concluded that the most im-
poverished families may or may not reside in the districts with the
lowest property values.49 A total denial of public education was
something of great concern to Justice Powell. In the absence of
such denial, however, Justice Powell could find no equal protection
violation in Rodriguez under a suspect class analysis."
43. Id. at 6.
44. Id. at 56. Indeed, "the general consensus was that the United States Supreme
Court would uphold the Rodriguez decision." W. Norton Grubb, The First Round of
Legislative Reforms in the Post-Serrano World, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 459-60
(1974). Partially because of this belief, eleven states had modified their school financ-
ing systems in the preceding few years. Id.
45. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
46. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 56-57. ("[U]nless there is to be a
substantial increase in state expenditures on education across the board - an event the
likelihood of which is open to considerable question.").
47. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
48. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 51.
49. Id. at 56.
50. Id. at 58. Justice Powell served on a state commission on constitutional revi-
sion, centering his work on granting the state board of education a larger role in
setting educational standards and in mandating that counties and municipalities not
shut their schools down. Public schools had been shut down in parts of Virginia after
688
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Similar concerns led Justice Powell to hold that education is not
a fundamental right, and even if it were, that the Texas funding
scheme would not infringe upon it.51 He emphasized that the state
of Texas provided children with at least "basic minimal skills, 52
and that Texas had continually sought to "extend," not contract,
public education. 3
As for federalism concerns, Justice Powell stated that "this
Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience ' 54 argued
against federal court action in such a state matter. Ironically, Jus-
tice Powell's own expertise in education led him to believe that
states might have a variety of legitimate means to solve the
problems of education financing, and that the Supreme Court
should not mandate one method.
As of 2002, the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a funda-
mental right to an education; would Justice Powell, were he alive
today, do so? It seems doubtful that he would reverse the Rodri-
guez decision and recognize such a right.
We can find evidence for this conclusion in Plyler v. Doe,55 as
well as in Martinez v. Bynum. 56 In Plyler, a 1982 case, the Supreme
Court struck down a Texas statute denying free education to un-
documented alien children by permitting public schools to refuse
admission to these children. 7 Justice Powell concurred in Plyler,
finding that the state law improperly created an "underclass" of
uneducated persons.5 8 His analysis, however, steered clear of a re-
traction of his previous federalism arguments in Rodriguez and he
wrote separately "to emphasize the unique character of the cases
before us."'59 Note also that the Plyler facts, where children were
denied an education, did cause an "absolute deprivation" of educa-
tion, which Justice Powell always opposed.60
Martinez v. Bynum61 was a 1983 Powell decision upholding a
Texas statute requiring minors to live with their parents or guardi-
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
POWELL PAPERS, supra note 20, at 44.
51. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S, at 79.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 81.
54. Id. at 85.
55. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
56. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
57. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205.
58. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239.
59. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 236.
60. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
61. Martinez, 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
20011
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
ans in order to attend public school. Characterizing the law as a
bona fide residence requirement,62 Justice Powell also emphasized
the importance of "local control, '63 a touchstone of Rodriguez. No
constitutional rights were violated by the Texas law.
Although Justice Powell would probably decide the Rodriguez
case the same way today, he might be pleased with another post-
Rodriguez development: state supreme courts in a number of states
have found a fundamental right to an education pursuant to a state
constitution equal protection clause 64 or an article of the state con-
stitution addressing education. 65 These state constitutional rulings
would meet the federalism and "local control" concerns expressed
by Justice Powell in Rodriguez, while ensuring all children the right
to a quality education.66
B. Ingraham v. Wright
Ingraham v. Wright,67 a Justice Powell opinion upholding the
constitutional use of corporal punishment in American public
schools, is superficially difficult to explain. However, a close analy-
sis of the case reveals its justifications, and Justice Powell might
conceivably rule differently on this issue today if he had the
opportunity.
In Ingraham, as in Rodriguez, Justice Powell wrote for a bare
majority. The lower federal courts were similarly divided. The dis-
trict court originally dismissed the action,68 only to be reversed by
the Fifth Circuit,69 which then reversed again sitting en banc.7 °
The plaintiffs in Ingraham were two boys who brought an action
on behalf of themselves and other students for overly severe corpo-
ral punishment. They claimed that the school authorities had vio-
lated their Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual
punishment and their procedural due process rights.71 One boy
62. Id. at 329.
63. Id. See Urofsky, supra note 20, at 598-99.
64. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Washakie County Sch.
Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
65. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989);
McDuffy v. Sec. of Exec. Off. of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
66. See THE POWELL PAPERS, supra note 20 at 17 (referencing a speech by Justice
Powell in February, 1958, entitled "Quality in Education: A National Necessity. Ad-
dress to Richmond Public School Teachers").
67. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
68. Id. at 654.
69. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974).
70. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976).
71. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 654.
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had received twenty "licks" from a paddle, which caused him to
miss school for several days.72 The other child had been struck on
the arm with such force that he could not properly use the arm for
a week.73 Although the school board policy authorizing corporal
punishment contained some limitations, it was amended while the
suit was pending to ban the punishments the two boys actually re-
ceived."4 This fact may have been relevant to the Court in deciding
the case, although it was not emphasized.
Justice Powell began by noting that corporal punishment was
used by public schools "in most parts of the country '7 5 and had
been banned in only two states. Thus, at the very outset of Ingra-
ham he emphasized the notion of local control, as in his other edu-
cation law opinions.76
Justice Powell then reasoned that the Eighth Amendment cannot
be applied in a non-criminal setting.7 7 He proved this by reciting
the history of the Amendment, which he describes as being derived
from the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which in turn was
based on the English Bill of Rights of 1689.78 Knowing the Vir-
ginia-based history of the Eighth Amendment, along with Justice
Powell's identification with his home state,79 should have given
pause to any advocate making such an argument.
The procedural due process discussion in Ingraham is classic
Powell, drawing on his majority opinion in Matthews v. Eldridge0
and his dissent in Goss v. Lopez.8 In Ingraham, Justice Powell
found that corporal punishment could violate a student's liberty
72. Id. at 658.
73. Id. at 658.
74. "Licks" were limited to seven for junior and senior grades and a student could
only be hit on the buttocks. Id. at 658 n.7. A student was also supposed to be "con-
temporaneously" told about the need for punishment and his or her parents notified
thereafter. Id.
75. Id. at 662.
76. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. See Urofsky, supra note 20 at
624.
77. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 666 (discussing how the Eighth Amendment cruel and
unusual test has historically only applied to criminal situations).
78. Id. at 664.
79. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
80. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that procedural due pro-
cess was satisfied by a swift post-deprivation hearing on the termination of federal
disability benefits); see Neuborne, supra note 15, at 1649-1650.
81. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating due
process protections were not afforded to public school students for suspensions of ten
days or less).
2001]
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interest,82 but that after-the-fact common law remedies provided
adequate safeguards for any procedural due process concerns.8 3
Unlike his opinion in Goss, where Powell stated that the students
had a "state-created property interest, ' 84 in Ingraham, Justice Pow-
ell found no constitutional right for students to avoid corporal pun-
ishment in all instances. Recall as well that Justice Powell's
overriding concern in many education cases was a student's "abso-
lute deprivation" of education8 5 not the "inadvertent" loss of edu-
cation found in Ingraham to be "an aberration."86 He found that a
constitutional based remedy would only marginally reduce the risk
of abusive punishment resulting in a loss of educational opportu-
nity, but would cause a "significant intrusion" into local control of
schools. For Powell, this was an unacceptable result.87
Although the Ingraham opinion is deliberative and generally
well analyzed, one could argue that Justice Powell might view cor-
poral punishment differently today. Of primary relevance is the
fact that in a footnote Justice Powell left open the possibility that
corporal punishment could constitute a violation of substantive due
process.8 8 Using an alternative legal theory to procedural due pro-
cess might appeal to Justice Powell, as Justice Powell himself had
spoken of his overriding respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.89
A number of United States circuit and district courts have ruled
that egregious examples of public school corporal punishment can
violate a student's substantive due process rights,9" although the
82. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673-74 (discussing that an individual cannot be harmed
physically by the state without due process).
83. Id. at 674-75.
84. Id. at 674 n.43.
85. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
86. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 677 (discussing that although students had testified to
specific abuse, there is no reason to believe that such abuse is customary).
87. Id. at 682.
88. "We have no occasion in this case.., to decide whether or under what circum-
stances corporal punishment of a public school child may give rise to an independent
federal cause of action to vindicate substantive rights under the Due Process Clause."
Id. at 679 n.47.
89. Haupt, supra note 21, at 25.
90. E.g., Neal v. Fulton, 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000); Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118
F. 3d 507 (6th Cir. 1997); Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1988); Wise v. Pea
Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F. 2d 560 (8th Cir. 1988); Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (10th
Cir. 1987); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980); Kurilla v. Callahan, 68 F.
Supp. 2d 556 (M.D. Penn. 1999) (finding a substantive due process claim present only
where facts "shock the conscience"); cf. Bisignano v. Harrison, 113 F. Supp. 2d 951
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Fourth Amendment claim possible under "secure in their persons"
clause); Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist., 870 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1994), affd, 68 F.3d
1010 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment challenge possible under "secure in their
692
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Supreme Court has yet to rule on this issue. A brief discussion of
the facts of a few of these federal cases is relevant.
In Hall v. Tawney,91 for example, a student was beaten so se-
verely that she was hospitalized for ten days.92 In Garcia v.
Miera,93 a nine-year-old girl was held up by her ankles and hit on
her legs until they bled. 94 Webb v. McCullough95 concerned a prin-
cipal who knocked down a locked bathroom door, threw a student
against the wall, and slapped her.96 Contrary to Justice Powell's
assertion in Ingraham, such egregious examples of corporal punish-
ment in American public schools do not seem aberrational. 97 Per-
haps as a result, approximately half of American states ban any use
of corporal punishment in public schools whatsoever.98
Justice Powell may have been somewhat blind to this situation
because of his own gentleness. Justice O'Connor has described
Justice Powell as follows: "[I] have known no one in my lifetime
who is kinder or more courteous than he." 99 Justice Powell ex-
tended substantive due process protections to related family mem-
bers in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,10 and to involuntarily
committed persons in Youngberg v. Romeo.10' It is not impossible
to conceive that, upon finding that the abuse of corporal punish-
ment was more widespread than Ingraham conceived, Justice Pow-
persons" clause). But see London v. DeWitt Pub. Sch., 194 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 1999);
Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding no violation of substantive due
process exists when adequate state remedies are present); Watson v. Alvarado Indep.
Sch. Dist., Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-0747-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10231 (N.D. Tex.
2001); Harris v. Tate County Sch. Dist., 882 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
91. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
92. Id. at 614.
93. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987).
94. Id. at 658.
95. Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1987).
96. Id. at 1154.
97. Cf. Raymond Hernandez, Children's Sexual Exploitation Underestimated,
Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2001, at A18 (noting that forty-nine percent of the
325,000 children sexually exploited annually were sexually assaulted by an acquain-
tance such as a teacher, coach, or neighbor).
98. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 49000, 49001 (West 1993); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 298-16 (1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37G (West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A: G-1 (West 1999); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 19.5 (1999).
99. The Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 395 (1987).
100. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977) (establishing
substantive due process right of related persons to live together).
101. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1982) (guaranteeing involuntarily
committed persons a right to minimal training).
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ell might have ultimately found to encompass substantive due
process as well as public school corporal punishment. 10 2
C. Committee of Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist
Justice Lewis Powell was a prolific and exacting jurist with re-
spect to the Establishment Clause. Although he participated in ap-
proximately thirty major decisions on the Establishment Clause, he
always managed to vote on the prevailing side. °3 Justice Powell
attained this extraordinary level of judicial success while acknowl-
edging the profound complexity of the area: "[W]hile there has
been general agreement upon the applicable principles and upon
the framework of analysis, the Court has recognized its inability to
perceive with invariable clarity the 'lines of demarcation in this ex-
traordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law. ' 0 4 Over the
course of his long judicial career he became one of the great inter-
preters of the Establishment Clause, and future scholars would be
wise to consider his views.
One of Justice Powell's most significant Establishment Clause
opinions is Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist.10 5 Nyquist involved the constitutionality of a New York
statute that financially subsidized non-public schools through three
programs: (1) direct aid to non-public schools for "maintenance
and repair"; (2) tuition reimbursement to low-income parents; and
(3) tax deductions for parents who could not qualify for tuition re-
imbursement.106 Justice Powell found all three programs violated
the Establishment Clause. Eight Justices found the maintenance
and repair plans to be constitutionally repugnant' 07 and six Justices
struck down the reimbursement and tax deduction programs as
102. Justice Powell would later reconsider at least one of his decisions. He ulti-
mately thought that he should have sided with the dissenters in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), which held that sexual orientation is not a fundamental right
protected by the Equal Protection clause. Linda Greenhouse, When Second Thoughts
In Case Come Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at A14.
103. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 360 (Melvin
I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
104. Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761 n.5
(1973) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
105. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 798 (holding that New York law providing various forms
of financial assistance to non-public schools violated Establishment Clause).
106. Id. at 761-67.
107. Justice White was the only Justice who would uphold the maintenance and
repair provisions. Id. at 820 (White, J., dissenting).
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well. 10 8 The Nyquist case is therefore a strongly established
ruling. 10 9
Justice Powell's majority opinion in Nyquist is filled with bal-
anced yet rhapsodic writing. He begins the opinion with the fol-
lowing words: "As a result of these decisions and opinions, it may
no longer be said that the Religion Clauses are free of 'entangling
precedents.' Neither, however, may it be said that Jefferson's 'wall
of separation' between Church and State has become 'as winding
as the famous serpentine wall' he designed for the University of
Virginia.""'o
Eight Justices, led by Justice Powell, readily found the "mainte-
nance and repair" provisions to violate the Establishment Clause.
As the funds were given to non-public schools directly and without
a requirement that they be used solely to sustain facilities used for
a secular purpose, the provisions violated the second prong of the
test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman." He wrote, "[T]his sec-
tion has a primary effect that advances religion in that it subsidizes
directly the religious activities of sectarian elementary and secon-
dary schools."' 1 2
The tuition reimbursement and tax deduction programs also
failed the "effects" prong of the Lemon standard. The reimburse-
ment plan was particularly suspect, as the state had created no
means of "guaranteeing that the state aid derived from public
funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral and nonideologi-
cal purposes .... 1113 Justice Powell did not find controlling the fact
that the reimbursement was received by parents, and not by the
school directly: "[I]f the grants are offered as an incentive to par-
ents to send their children to sectarian schools by making un-
restricted cash payments to them, the Establishment Clause is
violated whether or not the actual dollars given eventually find
108. Chief Justice Burger dissented, along with Justices Rehnquist and White. Id.
at 805-06.
109. But cf. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding, in a five-to-four deci-
sion, a Minnesota state law allowing all parents a state income tax deduction for tui-
tion, textbooks, and transportation expenses).
110. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 761 (quoting McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238
(1948)).
111. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The three-prong Lemon test re-
quires that the statute in question must have a secular legislative purpose; that its
primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and that it must not foster
"an excessive government entanglement with religion." Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
112. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774.
113. Id. at 780.
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their way into the sectarian institution.""' 4 Justice Powell also
found the tax deduction plan, which in some ways actually oper-
ated as a tax credit,115 to impermissibly advance religion in the
same ways that the reimbursement program did. 116
Given that later in his career Justice Powell supported a Minne-
sota law that gave parents of private and public school students a
state tax deduction for educational expenses, 1 7 what should we
consider the legal touchstones to be for Justice Powell in this area?
The answer appears in Nyquist:
One factor of recurring significance in this weighing process is
the potentially divisive political effect of an aid program....
[Clompetition among religious sects for political and religious
supremacy has occasioned considerable civil strife .... As Mr.
Justice Harlan put it, '[Wlhat is at stake as a matter of policy [in
Establishment Clause cases] is preventing that kind and degree
of government involvement in religious life that, as history
teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political
system to the breaking point.' 18
When states give public and private schools indirect financial
support that they otherwise would not receive, as in Mueller v. Al-
len, Justice Powell must have foreseen less of the political divisive-
ness that concerned him in Nyquist. Additionally, Justice Powell's
dedicated career in public education would probably lead him to
support state programs that truly financially assisted public schools
and that gave only targeted state aid to secular components of a
private school's program. 9 Particularly coming from Virginia, a
colony with no particular religious designation, Justice Powell
114. Id. at 786. But cf. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (allowing a tax deduc-
tion to all Minnesota parents on the basis that the tax deduction was intended to
further education and ensure the financial health of schools).
115. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 789-90
116. Id. at 794.
117. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 761, 786.
118. 413 U.S. at 795-96 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)). Accord Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 416-17 (1985) (Justice Powell,
concurring) (stating that government entanglement in religious education brings a
heavy risk of divisiveness and strife).
119. See Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (allowing state provided secular
textbooks at both public and private schools); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (sustaining reimbursement of parents' bus fares for students at parochial
schools). Both Everson and Allen were cited with approval by Justice Powell in Ny-
quist. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774-776. See also Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973)
(striking down a Pennsylvania program awarding reimbursement to parents sending
child to non-public schools); cf. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764




tended towards Jefferson's Wall of Separation, an image he in-
voked frequently. a2 ° It is possible as well that Justice Powell's
stormy personal experiences with the desegregation of public
schools in Richmond 121 made him particularly sensitive to the de-
stabilizing effects of controversial political and religious arguments
involving public schools.
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to a
Sixth Circuit case, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 22 which squarely
implicates the validity of Justice Powell's holding in Nyquist.123 In
Simmons-Harris, Ohio instituted a voucher program to aid educa-
tion in Cleveland, Ohio. Partly aimed at low-income families, Ohio
provided scholarships to almost 4000 Cleveland children to be used
for private school tuition during the 1999-2000 school year.
124
About sixty percent of the families were at or below the federal
poverty level,1 25 and ninety-six percent of these children attended
religiously-based schools.1 26 Both the federal district court and the
Circuit Court of Appeals found the program violated the Establish-
ment Clause under the Nyquist holding.
The Simmons-Harris case has excited much political and legal
interest; many amicus briefs from educational organizations have
been filed with the Supreme Court. 27 Notably, the United States
Solicitor General's Office filed an amicus brief urging the Court to
accept review. This is unusual since tradition dictates that the So-
licitor General only enter a case after the Court has made its certi-
orari ruling. In its brief, the Solicitor General's Office argues that
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals "erred in concluding that the
validity of the Ohio program in this case is controlled by Ny-
quist,'' 28 and in any event, "[t]o the extent that Nyquist is read to
cast doubt on the program at issue in this case, we urge the Court
to consider whether the assumptions underlying the 'effect' analy-
120. See id. at 761. See also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 606 (1987) (concur-
ring opinion joined by Justice O'Connor).
121. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
122. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
123. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 23 (2001).
124. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 949.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Docket No. 00-1751, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/00-1751.
htm. Among the groups filing amicus briefs are the Center for Education Reform,
the National Association of Independent Schools, the Black Alliance for Educational
Options, the Ohio School Boards Association, and the National Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty. Id.
128. Brief of the United States Solicitor General at 11, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
(Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, and 00-1779).
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sis in Nyquist have been eroded by the Court's subsequent Estab-
lishment Clause decisions."12 9  In other words, the Solicitor
General argues that the Court should overrule Nyquist, much as it
did Aguilar v. Felton,'130 another major Establishment Clause case
overruled in an after-the-fact manner by Agostini v. Felton.131
The Cleveland program surely violates Nyquist, as well as an-
other Powell ruling decided the same day, Sloan v. Lemon.1 32 In
Sloan, Justice Powell struck down a Pennsylvania program that re-
imbursed parents for tuition expenses at non-public schools.
Scholarship checks in Simmons-Harris are made payable to the
parents, but are mailed directly "to the school selected by the par-
ents, where the parents are required to endorse the checks over to
the school in order to pay tuition.' 33 There is no requirement that
the funds be used only for sectarian purposes, another key factor in
Nyquist.134 Finally, although adjacent public schools may techni-
cally receive scholarship monies, none has done so.1 35 In a number
of ways, therefore, the Cleveland program is almost akin to the
very forbidden "maintenance and repair" funds of Nyquist, not the
"neutrally provided" tax deductions of Mueller. The program also
is more constitutionally suspect than the reimbursement provisions
in Nyquist, where the state funds stayed with the parents. Sloan v.
Lemon is also very apposite. If alive today Justice Powell would
assuredly agree with the Sixth Circuit and rule that the holding in
Nyquist invalidated the Ohio program. In addition, Justice Pow-
ell's concern about religious and political strife is already evident in
the many newspaper, magazine, and television accounts describing
the general issue of vouchers in American society.
III. COULD THE SUPREME COURT UPHOLD JUSTICE POWELL'S
BAKKE RULING IN 2002?
Of all of Justice Powell's rulings none has been more controver-
sial than his ruling in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.136 Indeed, it can be argued that only Roe v. Wade,1 37 the
129. Id. at 18.
130. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
131. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
132. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
133. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 948.
134. Cf. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 857 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(arguing that plaintiffs should have to prove that state aid is being used for religious
purposes).
135. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 949.
136. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Supreme Court opinion upholding a right to abortion, has gener-
ated more interest in the last fifty years of Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
Justice Powell devoted much thought and study to the issue of
affirmative action, even prior to the Court's receipt of the Bakke
case. In a 1990 interview, Justice Powell had this to say concerning
his Bakke opinion.
I'm proud my name is on that opinion .... Some people have
said I waited to see how the other Justices would vote, but that's
not so. The year before Bakke was argued, we had a case
named Defunis that came up from the University of Washing-
ton. It presented basically the same issue, that is, the validity of
a university's setting aside a specific category, be it blacks or
Chicanos or Eskimos. The Defunis case had been argued, but
the case became moot when the University of Washington ac-
cepted a change in the system, and the case didn't have to be
decided.
That summer, knowing we had granted Bakke certiorari in order
to address the issue, I spent a fair amount of time, in addition to
what I'd spent in connection with Defunis, thinking how I should
vote in Bakke and, if I wrote the opinion, what I should say. The
fact that I had been interested in education, I think, helped me. I'd
been on the board of Washington and Lee University, on the board
of Union Theological Seminary [and] I was very conscious of the
fact that in our society diversity was critically important, so I had
generally decided how I would write Bakke before the case was
argued. Nevertheless, it was a difficult opinion to write.
138
The Lewis F. Powell archival material concerning the Bakke case
is almost two feet in length, more material than that of any other
Powell case. 13
9
In Bakke, Justice Powell found the admissions program at the
Medical School of the University of California at Davis unconstitu-
tional. The program in 1973 and 1974 set aside sixteen out of one
hundred seats in the entering class for a "special" admissions pro-
gram.' 40 Though the program was ostensibly aimed toward eco-
nomically disadvantaged applicants, only certain ethnic and racial
groups were considered under these procedures. Four Justices
137. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The final member of the most ground-
breaking triad of Supreme Court cases in the post World-War II era would have to be
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
138. Haupt, supra note 21, at 23-24 (emphasis added).
139. THE POWELL PAPERS, supra note 20, at 49.
140. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275.
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found the special admissions program violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, while four other Justices, the dissenters, would
have sustained the program under both Title VI and equal protec-
tion principles."'
Justice Powell's opinion found that the program violated equal
protection, because limiting certain seats to only some racial and
ethnic groups was not "necessary to promote a substantial state
interest.' 1 42 He further ruled, however, that a university might use
race or ethnicity as a factor in admissions in a "properly devised"
program. 143 Such a program could have as its goal the "attainment
of a diverse student body, ' 144 which Justice Powell linked with aca-
demic freedom, "a special concern of the First Amendment."'
' 45
Justice Powell argued that a diverse student body would promote a
"robust exchange of ideas."'1 46
A series of state and lower federal court cases have called into
question the continuing constitutional viability of Justice Powell's
reasoning in Bakke. For instance, in Grutter v. Bollinger, a federal
district court in Michigan held that Justice Powell's diversity ratio-
nale in Bakke was not a controlling test to determine a compelling
state interest. 47 More recently, the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that
Justice Powell's diversity ruling is not constitutionally "binding.'
' 48
The Supreme Court has not granted a petition for certiorari con-
cerning any university admissions cases.
If presented with a university admissions case, it is possible or
perhaps even likely that the Supreme Court will continue to up-
hold Justice Powell's diversity rationale. For instance, in a very re-
cent Supreme Court case, Hunt v. Cromarte,49 Justice Breyer,
writing for a bare majority, upheld a state redistricting plan where
racial considerations did not "predominate."' 150 In other words,
some governmental use of race was allowable. The Court has also
141. Id. at 269-72.
142. Id. at 320.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 311.
145. Id. at 312 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
146. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
147. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 847-48 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (striking
down admissions program at University of Michigan Law School). Accord Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-45 (5th Cir. 1996). But see Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law
Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200-1201 (9th Cir. 2000); Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811,
819-21 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
148. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234 (1lth Cir. 2001).
149. Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
150. Id. at 1466.
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continued to emphasize in recent cases the importance of academic
freedom in the mission of higher education. 151 In addition, the ac-
tual thinking of the Supreme Court concerning Bakke may be
somewhat illuminated by their upcoming ruling in an important,
pending governmental contracting case, Adarand Constructors Inc.
v. Mineta.15 2 Of particular interest is that in Adarand, the Solicitor
General's Office has indicated that it will be supporting the gov-
ernment's race-conscious program. President Bush's nominee for
general counsel of the U.S. Department of Education has also
stated in recent Congressional hearings that racial diversity in uni-
versity admissions may be a compelling state interest. 153 Viewing
these indicators as a whole, the Supreme Court appears to be
poised to sustain Justice Powell's Bakke ruling.
CONCLUSION
Justice Powell's experience and background in education served
him and the American people extremely well. Justice Powell's va-
ried life experience tempered the law's occasional rigidity. I once
proposed a law school hypothetical of an affirmative action pro-
gram for the Supreme Court itself. The plan was based not on the
Justices' race or gender, but on requirements of "occupational" di-
versity: lawyer/doctors, lawyer/educators, lawyer/accountants, etc.
Though the hypothetical was for a law school course, perhaps
American Presidents may want to consider such notions in making
Supreme Court appointments, in the mold of the Honorable Lewis
Franklin Powell, Jr.
151. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 236-37 (2000) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
152. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F. 3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001).
153. Ben Gose, Education Department Nominee Moderates Views on Affirmative
Action, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept.14, 2001, at A29.
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